This paper examines the driving forces of China's contracted engineering projects in Africa.
Introduction
China's fast-growing economic ties with Africa have attracted considerable attention. According to the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics, China's trade (exports plus imports) with Africa increased steadily from $1.21 billion in 1990 to $135.75 billion in 2011. The rise of the Chinese economy has fueled global demand for oil and other primary commodities. However, Africa's rapidly growing exports to China are not limited to fuels and other mineral products. Laborintensive raw or semi-processed agricultural commodities that are used for further processing either for industrial use (timber, cotton) or for consumer use (food products) are also increasingly imported by China (Broadman, 2007) .
Likewise, China has become one of the major capital providers for countries in Africa.
Several papers have examined the driving forces of Chinese Outward Direct Investment (ODI) in
Africa.
1 Cheung et al. (2012a) examined to what extent China's ODI is driven by standard economic determinants of foreign direct investment. They conclude that there is evidence in support of the market-seeking motive, the risk-avoiding motive, and the resources-seeking motive. Once an investment decision is made, China tends to invest more in oil-producing African countries. Cheung et al. (2012b) analyzed whether also political considerations and hostcountry characteristics affect China's ODI in Africa. Their main findings are that in the 1990s political variables seem to dominate economic determinants of China's ODI in Africa. The likelihood that a country receives ODI from China increases if the country concerned is a political ally of China, has diplomatic relations with China, is corrupt, democratic, and politically stable. In contrast, more recent data suggest that most political variables turn out to be insignificant. Instead, China's ODI in Africa is mainly driven by economic ties with the host country and the drive for natural resources.
Aid is yet another channel via which China interacts with Africa. Dreher and Fuchs (2012) tested to which extent political and commercial interests shape China's aid allocation decisions. They find that political considerations are an important determinant of China's allocation of aid: countries that vote in line with China in the United Nations General Assembly and do not recognize Taiwan as an independent country receive more aid. In contrast to widespread perceptions, they find no evidence that China's aid allocation is dominated by natural resource endowments or is biased towards autocratic or corrupt regimes. China's aid is, for the most part, independent of the recipients' institutional characteristics, which seems to confirm China's non-interference principle.
In addition to trade, ODI and aid, contracted engineering projects are another important, yet so far largely ignored, channel through which China interacts with Africa. These projects include building of highways and roads, bridges, schools, shopping centers, housing and office buildings, water conservancy, dams, and power plants. The amount of contracted engineering projects has increased steadily over time and displayed a significant jump in the 2000s after the first Forum (2000) on China-Africa Cooperation. 2 As Figure 1 shows, the dollar value of China's contracted engineering projects dwarfs its ODI in Africa. In 2010 Chinese ODI in Africa amounted to $2.1 billion, while the contracted engineering projects amounted to $38.3 billion. Figure 2 shows the distribution of contracted engineering projects across African countries over the period 1990-2010. As Figure 2 shows, there is quite some variability. In total, Algeria received most contracted engineering projects, i.e. $28.73 billion USD; several countries, such as Swaziland, Benin, Somalia, had almost no projects in the period under consideration.
[ The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Drawing on Cheung et al. (2012a,b) , section 2 presents the hypotheses tested. Section 3 contains the main estimation results, while section 4 presents some additional findings. The final section concludes. Table 1 shows the hypotheses to be tested. The first column shows the hypotheses, while the second column shows the proxies used to test the hypotheses. The third column shows the expected sign of the proxies.
Hypotheses
[Insert Table 1 here]
Following Cheung et al. (2012b) , we distinguish between three groups of hypotheses.
The first set of hypotheses refers to 'standard' economic determinants of Chinese contracted engineering projects in Africa. The second group of hypotheses focuses on political ties between the host country and China, while the third subset of hypotheses refers to political and institutional characteristics of the host country. Data availability primarily determined the list of hypotheses tested. The Appendix offers summary statistics of the data used and provides detailed information on their sources.
Economic motives
The first hypothesis is that the size of Chinese contracted engineering projects in Africa is determined by the drive for new markets. As Broadman (2007) points out, one of the main bottlenecks for trade with Africa is poor infrastructure. It is hypothesized that China will focus on those countries that, once new infrastructure will be in place, offer most opportunities for lucrative trade in view of the size of their markets. According to our first hypothesis, the market potential of the host country is expected to have a positive impact on Chinese contracted engineering projects in Africa.
Hypothesis 1: China has more contracted engineering projects (in terms of contract value) with African countries with large market potential.
We use the log of real GDP per capita in US$ (RGDPpc it-1 ) as a proxy for market potential of the host country i in year t-1. the host country has a positive impact on the value of engineering projects in that country.
The second proxy for economic ties is the stock (i.e., the accumulated flows) of Chinese ODI in the host country. The more China has invested in a country, the stronger its interests will be in that particular country. We have data on the stock of approved ODI as annually published MOFCOM published the stock of China's outward direct investment according to IMF-OECD standard (NWODI it-1 ). These data are measured differently from the stock of approved ODI so that the series cannot be merged. We scale NWODI it-1 in the same way as AODI it-1 .
The incentive to sign contracts for engineering projects could be adversely affected by the presence of risk factors. Traditionally, many African countries are considered to be very risky (Asiedu, 2002) . Risk influences the payoff of an engineering project in different stages. High risk could lead to higher construction costs, or even default at the end of the projects. According to our second hypothesis, high-risk countries in Africa will receive less Chinese contracted engineering projects. 
Political ties between China and Africa
Political factors play a role in China's economic relations with Africa. For instance, Cheung et al. (2012b) report that China invested relatively more in countries that can be considered as political allies. Dreher and Fuchs (2012) show that China gives significantly less aid to countries that recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Similar considerations may play a role in engineering contracts. We therefore have the following hypotheses: To test this hypothesis, we use dummies for each of the conferences (Forum t ). Before the conference, the dummy is zero, while after the conference it is one, thereby testing whether each of the four conferences led to more projects.
Host country characteristics
Finally, we test whether host country characteristics influence the allocation of China's engineering projects in Africa. Some observers criticize China's policy as it tolerates, and passively exacerbates, authoritarian regimes and human right violations. For instance, Brookes To test this hypothesis we use the variable Democracy it-1 that ranges from 10 (Full Democracy) to -10 (Full Autocracy). The data is taken from the Polity IV database. The expected sign of this variable is negative.
The military is not elected by anyone. Therefore, its involvement in politics reduces democratic accountability. Meanwhile, the involvement of the military in politics may signal an (actual or created) internal or external threat to security. On the other hand, a military regime may provide a certain level of stability in the short term and thus reduce business risks. However, in the longer term it arguably leads to a more corrupted government and creates an armed opposition, which leads to more frequent and large-scale armed conflicts. According to Busse and Hefeker (2007) , lower military participation leads to more foreign investment inflows.
Hypothesis 10: China has more contracted engineering projects with African countries with countries with a low degree military participation in politics.
To test this hypothesis, we use the variable, Military it-1 , as provided by ICRG. It measures the level of military participation in politics, with a low value (it ranges from 0 to 6) indicating a greater degree of military participation in politics. Thus, we expect a negative sign for this proxy.
Although corruption is often perceived to deter FDI because it represents an extra tax and increases investment costs, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) argues that investors who have been exposed to bribery at home will not be deterred by corruption abroad, but instead seek countries where corruption is prevalent. The similarities in the conditions of the institutional environment induce these investors to focus their FDI there. Indeed, Cheung et al. (2012b) report that China invests in countries in Africa with a high level of corruption. We will test whether this also holds for engineering projects. Cheung et al. (2012b) find also that countries with a poor system of law and order receive less ODI from China. This is in line with the general view that a poor institutional environment deters foreign investment (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002 ). We will examine whether this holds for engineering projects as well. Databanks (2010) . The expected sign is negative.
Empirical Results
As our data on China's contracted engineering projects is highly skewed, we scaled the data by the host country's population and express it in logarithms. The log transformation method of Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) is used to transform zero-value observations.
We use the following regression specification:
ECI is a vector of variables representing the economic motives behind China's contracted engineering projects in Africa, while POL is a vector of variables showing the political ties between China and the host country, and ICC is a vector of variables describing the host country's characteristics. c i is the unobserved country-fixed effect while θ t is the year-specific effect. To avoid endogeneity problems, we use the lagged value for most of the explanatory variables. Table 2 presents the results for the period 1991-2010. We test the three groups of hypotheses first separately. We take the significant variables as identified in each round of regressions and then use a general-to-specific approach to come up with our final model. Column
(1) of (3) and (4) show results for the second and third groups of variables, i.e. the political determinants and the host-country characteristics. In Column (5), we include all variables that are significant. Column (6) shows the results following the general-tospecific approach.
As the availability of the data differs per variable, the number of observations in each column of Table 2 differs. Following the same set-up as Table 2, Table 3 shows the results if we restrict the sample to the 33 countries and years (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) for which all required data are available.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] Our results suggest that some economic determinants play an important role in driving China's contracted engineering projects in Africa. First of all, the host country's GDP turns out to be significant in most of the models. Although it is insignificant in the final model when the unrestricted sample is concerned, it remains significant through all the models when the restricted sample is used. Thereby the results provide some support for hypothesis 1. Likewise, trade often comes up significantly, thereby providing support for hypothesis 4. The other hypotheses in the first category are not supported by our findings. Notably the insignificance of the abundance of natural resources of the host country is quite remarkable, as there is some evidence suggesting that Chinese ODI flows more to resource-rich countries in Africa. On the one hand, it suggests that China's ODI is more long-term oriented to secure the stable supply of natural resources. On the other hand, it also indicates that China's engineering projects may 9 See the Appendix for country list better facilitate the growth of resource-poor countries.
Our results also provide some support for the role of political factors: in the restricted sample (in Table 3 ), the more countries vote in line with China in the UN, the more contracted engineering projects they receive. Recognizing Taiwan as a state drives away China's contracted engineering projects. Also the Forum conferences turn out to be significant, thereby providing support for hypothesis 8. Jointly, the coefficients of the Forum dummies are significant, and also the coefficients of some conferences, notably the 2006 one, turn out to be positive and significant.
Finally, our results do not provide much support that host country characteristics matter.
The only significant factor is Military it-1 , i.e. the military's participation in politics. Our results suggest that countries with less military participation in politics receive more contracted engineering projects. LawandOrder it-1 is marginally significant, suggesting that countries with poor legal institutions get more projects. However, other host country characteristics that determine China's ODI in Africa according to previous studies, like corruption and political instability, do not affect China's engineering projects in Africa. It suggests that when contracted engineering projects are concerned, the non-interference policy is implemented more thoroughly.
Additional results
This section reports the results of two tests. First, it reports the outcomes for hypothesis 4, i.e. do countries which have received a lot of Chinese ODI also receive more engineering projects from China? Second, we examine whether the lack of infrastructure in the host country has an impact on China's engineering projects. The results are reported in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 here]
In Column (1), AODI it-1 is added to the model specification of Column (6) in Table 2 with the sample period narrowed to 1991-2005. NWODI it-1 is included in Column (2), which restricts the sample period to 2003-2010. The same regressions are shown in Columns (4) and (5), but now for the restricted sample of countries as used in Table 3 . In our previous work, we found that contracted engineering projects affect Chinese ODI in Africa. Our findings here are consistent with the view that projects affect ODI, but not the other way around.
In columns (3) and (6) we add an indicator of the amount of infrastructure in a country to examine whether our results change if we control for this variable. Our indicator, PavedRoad it-1 , is the percentage of paved road over total roads and is taken from the WDI dataset. The fact that it is insignificant shows no support for the hypothesis that countries that need more infrastructures receive more contracted engineering projects from China. Possible explanations are that those countries lack the basic infrastructures which make engineering projects profitable for Chinese contractors, or that they do not have sufficient funds to finance the projects. Table 5 shows the hypotheses tested and our findings. In addition, the table compares our results for China's engineering projects in Africa with our previous findings for Chinese ODI in Africa.
Discussion and conclusions
Engineering projects and ODI are both attracted to African countries that have large market potential (at least in the restricted sample), deep trade ties with China, and are political allies.
Although Cheung et al. (2012b) find that the role of being a political ally of China is negligible after 2002 for Chinese ODI in Africa it is significant for engineering projects where all data concerned is available for the whole period from 1990 to 2010.
[Insert Table 5 here]
There are also several factors that influence engineering projects but do not affect ODI. Another distinctive feature is the negative impact from the degree of military participation in politics. A high degree of military participation in politics implies policy distortions and a high level of political risk, which makes engineering projects less attractive. As to host-country characteristics, the significant determinants of ODI, i.e. level of corruption, political stability and institutional quality, do not influence engineering projects. Engineering projects are also not driven by the resource-seeking motive, the lack of infrastructure of the host country and the stock of ODI from China.
Our study shows that although there are some common determinants of China's ODI and contracted engineering projects in Africa, the drivers of engineering projects are not the same as those of ODI projects. Engineering projects are more motivated by economical and political factors but less influenced by host-country characteristics. In billions USD
